Europe is reorganizing its international value chain. I document these changes in Europe's international organization of production with new survey data of Austrian and German firms investing in Eastern Europe. I show estimates of the share of intrafirm trade between Austria or Germany on the one hand and Eastern Europe on the other. Furthermore, I present empirical evidence of the drivers of the new division of labor in Europe. I find among other things that falling trade costs and reduced levels of corruption as well as improvements in the contracting environment in Eastern Europe are affecting the level of intrafirm imports from that region. These factors also favor outsourcing over offshoring. In contrast, low organizational costs of hierarchies and large costs of holdup (when there are no alternative investors in Old Europe or no alternative suppliers in Eastern Europe) favor offshoring over outsourcing. Tax holidays granted by host countries in Eastern Europe also mildly affect the organizational choice.
Introduction
Within the last decade, a new division of labor has emerged in the world economy. The international division of labor is characterized by firms geographically separating different production stages across the world economy in order to exploit differences in production costs. Thus, firms organize their activity in a global value chain. With Eastern Enlargement, Europe is reorganizing its international value chain. European firms outsource and offshore production to Eastern Europe. As a result, Eastern
Europe is becoming an important location for European firms' international organization of production. This paper raises three issues. 
The Organizational Choice: Outsourcing versus Offshoring
Why do firms organize in an international value chain? Firm's management must decide regarding two aspects. First, how much control does it want over the firm's activity -that is, should the firm produce inside or outside of the firm boundaries? Second, where should it locate production, at home or abroad? These two decisions lead to the phenomenon of international outsourcing or offshoring. International outsourcing is a relocation of activity outside the firm to an independent input supplier in New Europe. Offshoring is a relocation to New Europe of activity that remains inside the firm.
The benefit of organizing an activity inside the firm is that headquarters then have more control over the activity and stronger incentives to provide headquarter services. The costs of hierarchies, however, include the loss of middle management initiative. The benefit of organizing an activity outside the firm by outsourcing to an independent input supplier is that it promotes the incentives and initiative of the input supplier. However, it does risk the cost of holdup due to incomplete contracting. The firm chooses the offshoring option when the net gain from organizing the activity inside the firm outweighs the costs: that is, when headquarter services are more important than the incentives of the input supplier on the one hand and, on the other hand, when reduced initiative on the part of skilled workers is less critical than the potential holdup problem. The firm chooses to outsource when the reverse is the case. Furthermore, the firm chooses the location with lowest production costs (including wages, transport costs, and the cost of contracting). Hence, a European firm will relocate activity inside or outside of firm boundaries to New Europe when unit labor costs there are lower than in Old Europe. 
Eastern Europe -A New Member in the International Division of Labor?
How important are outsourcing and offshoring to Eastern Europe? One way to answer this question is to look at the pattern of intrafirm trade with Eastern Europe. Antras (2003) and Antras and Helpman (2004) ; for the costs of hierarchies in the world economy see Marin and Verdier (2003, 2005) ; and for the extent of the division of labor see Acemoglu et al. (2005) . 3 For different measures of offshoring and outsourcing, see Hummels et al. (2001) and Hanson et al. (2001 Finally, the data allow me to calculate for the first time the share of intrafirm trade -international trade that takes place inside the multinational corporation between the parent firm (in Germany or Austria) and its affiliates in Eastern Europe. These numbers are given in 5 Austria's share of of intrafirm imports in total imports from Hungary exceeds 100% owing to one particular large investment for which we could not disentangle goods delivered to the parent firm in Austria from those goods delivered to the parent firm in Singapore.
1 For Austria, total trade with Eastern Europe is the average of 1999-2000, since the numbers of intrafirm exports and imports from the firm survey are from these years.
The survey information on intrafirm exports and imports varied greatly for individual countries in Eastern Europe as a result of missing cases. In order to make the intrafirm trade numbers comparable with total trade with Eastern Europe, we artificially reduced total exports and imports by the number of missing cases of intrafirm exports and imports for individual Eastern European countries. Exports (resp. imports) from Eastern Europe are reduced by a factor of 0.17 (resp. 0. 
Determinants of Offshoring and Outsourcing
What forces are driving the new international division of labor that is emerging in Europe? Section 2 briefly summarized the factors determining the choice of organization. The firm will allocate power to the headquarter (offshoring) when the headquarter's supply of services is more important than the input supplier's incentives to deliver a specialized input for a certain price, since the party with control captures a larger fraction of the surplus and thus will have greater incentives to supply its own services. Moreover, the firm will prefer offshoring to outsourcing when the organizational costs of hierarchies are less than the costs of holdups due to independent suppliers. The fall of communism and the prospect of Eastern Enlargement led to reduced trade costs and levels of corruption as well as to an improved contracting environment in the new member states, increasing the attraction of this region as a location for European firms' activities.
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In order to determine the choice of organization in Eastern Europe, I run two types of regressions.
First, I estimate the determinants of the share of intrafirm imports from affiliates in Eastern Europe as a percentage of parent firms' sales (the level of offshoring) in Austria and Germany; see Table 3 . Second, I show (in Table 4 ) probit estimates of the choice between outsourcing and offshoring by German (2005) and Lorentowicz et al. (2005) ; for its impact on unemployment in Austria and Germany, see Marin (2004) . For the pattern of skill offshoring to Eastern Europe, see Marin (2004) and . 6 Marin and Schnitzer (1995, 2002) and Nunn (2005) show that incentive problems and the contracting environment also affect the pattern of trade.
of organizing an activity inside the firm increase. This will be so, because firms choose a less hierarchical organization to avoid the costs of losing the initiative of their skilled workers.
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Starting with the right-hand side of These results suggest that German firms want to offshore to a low-wage country (and thus intrafirm imports are larger) when labor costs matter and transport costs are not too high. The risk of holdup is larger in countries with weak contract enforcement, and this increases the costs of organizing the activity outside the firm. The other measure of holdup, Aalternative, appears, however, not to be significant at conventional levels, whereas the cost-of-hierarchies variable workers' initiative is highly sig- The left-hand side of Table 3 summarizes the results for Austrian firms and shows some striking differences. Austrian firms do more offshoring when they are less (rather than more) R&D intensive and when they are capital intensive rather than labor intensive. This is so even when controlling for the fact that Austria's investments to Eastern Europe are mainly in the banking and financial service industries. Also, Austrian parent firms import the more from their Eastern European affiliates that are more R&D intensive. 8 Holdup costs (property rights and Aalternatives, not shown) and organizational costs (workers' initiative) are not significant, but tax holidays granted by the host country and productivity dispersion among firms both significantly affect the level of Austrian intrafirm imports.
I turn now to the choice of organization between outsourcing and offshoring by German firms; see Table 4 . To decide between outsourcing and offshoring is to decide on the amount of control the firm retains over activity in Eastern Europe. I use the German firm's control stake in its Eastern European affiliate to distinguish between outsourcing and offshoring: "outsourcing" applies when the parent firm's ownership share the Eastern European subsidiary is no more than 30%; "offshoring" applies 7 See Marin and Verdier (2003, 2005) for the reasoning. 8 These results are consistent with the fact that Austria is "human capital poor" relative to Eastern Europe and thus offshores the skill-intensive stages of production to that region (Marin 2004) ; for the effect of this on the skill premium in Austria, see Lorentowicz, Marin, Raubold (2005) .
when that share exceeds 30%. If the parent's controlling stake is less than 30%, then any deal between parent and affiliate more resembles an arms-length transaction than a transaction within the firm.
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German outsourcing to Eastern Europe relative to offshoring is more likely when the parent firm is more capital intensive and less R&D intensive and when transport costs are larger. These results are consistent with the estimates on intrafirm imports in Table 3 . Moreover, outsourcing relative to offshoring is more likely when the host country has a low level of corruption and when the holdup problem is mild because the input supplier in Eastern Europe can choose between several alternative investors from Old Europe. Both factors tend to lower the costs of organizing an activity outside the firm.
Finally, larger firms (as measured by the number of workers) with larger organizational costs tend to favor outsourcing, whereas the most productive firms (relative to the industry average) tend to favor offshoring. Productivity dispersion: where is firm's productivity and as the mean productivity over all firms.
Aalternative: dummy variable equal to 1 when there is no alternative supplier in Eastern Europe for the investor and equal to 0 when there is at least one alternative supplier.
Germany Austria
Workers' initiative: mean of 16 parent firm decisions (without R&D) including decision on acquisition or hiring a secretary; value ranges between 1 and 5, where 1 is decision at the CEO level and 5 is decentralized decision at the divisional level.
(K / L) P : parent firm's capital-to-labor ratio. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Productivity dispersion: where is firm's productivity and as the mean productivity over all firms.
L: number of parent firm's employees.
Palternative: dummy variable equal to 1 when there is no alternative partner for the supplier in Eastern Europe and equal to 0 when there is at least one alternative partner.
Corruption: corruption in the Eastern European country as perceived by the investor, ranging between 1 ( pervasive corruption) and 5 (no corruption). 
